The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of Union Employees: What Effect after the Demise of the At Will Doctrine by Pincus, S. Richard & Gillman, Steven L.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 59 Issue 4 Article 6 
October 1983 
The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of Union Employees: 
What Effect after the Demise of the At Will Doctrine 
S. Richard Pincus 
Steven L. Gillman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
S. R. Pincus & Steven L. Gillman, The Common Law Contract and Tort Rights of Union Employees: What 
Effect after the Demise of the At Will Doctrine, 59 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1007 (1983). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol59/iss4/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
THE COMMON LAW CONTRACT AND TORT RIGHTS OF
UNION EMPLOYEES: WHAT EFFECT AFTER THE
DEMISE OF THE "AT WILL" DOCTRINE?
S. RICHARD PINCUS* AND STEVEN L. GILLMAN**
Traditionally union employees covered by a collective bargaining
agreement were foreclosed from seeking to remedy unjust discharges
under the common law. Their rights are governed by the collective
bargaining agreement which typically prohibits discipline or discharge
without "just cause."' Employees seeking to vindicate an alleged un-
just discharge must do so under the contractually agreed-upon griev-
ance machinery normally culminating in final and binding arbitration.
As a result, the concept of just cause discharge is firmly entrenched in
the industrial common law.
2
In contrast to the discharge rights provided to organized workers,
unorganized workers, who comprise between sixty and sixty-five per-
cent of the non-agricultural work force,3 are without contractual job
protection. Their employment relationship, if of indefinite duration, is
terminable at will. The "at will" doctrine allows the employee or the
* B.A. George Washington University; J.D. University of Chicago, 1961. Mr. Pincus is a
partner in the Chicago law firm of Fox and Grove, which was counsel for the defendant in Rob-
erts v. Automobile Club of Michigan, and represented an amicus on behalf of the petitioner in
Belknap, Inc. v. Hale.
** B.A. Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations; J.D. University of
Michigan Law School, 1980. Mr. Gillman is an associate of Fox and Grove.
The authors express their appreciation for the assistance of Janice E. Linn rendered in prepa-
ration of this article.
I. Approximately seventy-nine percent of all collective bargaining agreements provide that
employees may not be terminated without "cause" or "just cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) § 40:1 (1979). Even where "just cause" protection is not
provided by express agreement, arbitrators may imply a "just cause" limitation on the employer's
right to discharge. See, e.g., Peerless Laundry Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 33 (1968) (Eaton Arb.); Keeny
Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 974 (1964) (Donnelly, Arlio Arbs.).
2. ELKOURI AND ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS ch. 15 (3d ed. 1976). Numerous
factors may be relevant in evaluating whether a termination is justified within the meaning of
"just cause". The more prominent factors include the nature of the offense, the grievant's past
record (including length of service), whether reasonable rules had been clearly disseminated and
enforced in a consistent manner, and whether the concept of progressive discipline has been
applied.
3. Approximately 60% to 65% of all American employees are hired on an at-will basis. An-
other 22% are unionized and approximately 15% are federal or state employees. See U.S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 427 (table 704) (union
membership); id. at 392 (table 644) (total work force); id. at 313 (table 509) (government employ-
ees). See generally Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 8-9 (1979).
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employer to terminate at any time, without notice and "for a good
cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong."' 4 The harshness
of the doctrine has been softened somewhat by federal and state anti-
discrimination laws.5 Furthermore, enlightened management may not
be disposed to engage in whimsical firings. Nonetheless, until recently
most unorganized, at will workers have remained at risk of unjust dis-
charge. Now viewed by some as an outmoded legal rule,6 a growing
number of state courts are chipping away at the doctrine or repudiating
it completely.
Judicial modification of the at will law has proceeded on three
fronts. First, and broadest, is an express contract theory which de-
scribes the employment at will doctrine as a presumptive rule of con-
struction, as opposed to a rule of substantive law. The presumption
may be rebutted by evidence of the parties' intent that the relationship
not be at will. 7 Thus, where an employer promises job protection in an
employment manual or gives other oral or written assurances upon
which the at will employee relies to his detriment, the presumption that
4. Payne v. The Western & Atlantic RR. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 520 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). In contrast, an employment
contract for a fixed or definite term may be terminated only for justifiable cause. See generally
Note, Job Security For The At Will Employee.- Contractual Right Of Discharge For Cause: Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 57 CHi-KENT L. REV. 697 (1981).
5. See, e.g., Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) (prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, and national origin); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (bars employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of age for workers between forty and seventy); the Federal Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (proscribes handicap discrimination in employment by governmental contrac-
tors); and the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA" or "Act"), §§ 7, 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1976) (prohibits discharge for engaging in union activity). More generally, on a
state-by-state basis statutes have been enacted which track and occasionally supplement the rights
and remedies granted employees by the federal equal employment laws. Some states also prohibit
discharge on the basis of political activity or affiliation (see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1102 (West
1971)), discriminatory discharge because of physical handicap, (see, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 1420(a) (West Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149 § 24k (Michie/Law Co-op 1976), retalia-
tory discharge for filing a workman's compensation claim (see, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1979)), and retaliatory discharge for reporting or threatening to report
the employer's violations or suspected violations of any federal or state law (see, e.g., Michigan
Whistleblower's Protection Act, Mcii. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.361 et seq. (1981)).
6. See, e.g., Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting The Abusive
Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Note, Protecting at Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge:" The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816
(1980); Peck, Unjust Dischargesfrom Employment- A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.
J. 1 (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481, 499-500 (1976).
This country is almost the last bastion in the industrialized world to withhold legal protection
against unjust dismissals. Some 65 nations prohibit unjust terminations, including all Common
Market countries, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Japan, Canada, and Puerto Rico. "The Employ-
ment-at-Will Issue," BNA Vol. 111, No. 23, p. 24.
7. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
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an indefinite contract is at will may be overcome.8
Second, some courts have sustained actions for wrongful discharge
on an implied contract theory. Under that theory, an employer may be
liable for wrongful discharge if he has violated the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing said to be inherent in all contracts, including em-
ployment contracts. The implied contract may be violated if a dis-
charge is not for "just cause."9
Finally, an exception to the at will doctrine has been recognized
under tort principles if the discharge violates public policy.' 0 Accord-
8. Id. at 599-600. Moreover, such assurances can become part of the parties' employment
contract even though there was no mutual intention to create contractual rights in the employee at
the time of hire and even though the employee did not learn of the policy until after the employ-
ment had commenced. 408 Mich. at 613-15. New York adopted the Toussaint rationale in Wei-
ner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982), in upholding a
breach of employment contract action where the employee alleged he was discharged without
cause in violation of the employer's written policy manual. See also Martin v. Federal Life Ins.
Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1st Dist. 1982), where an Illinois court treated an
indefinite term employment as merely creating a presumption of at will employment which could
be overcome by evidence that the employee gave up a competing employment offer in exchange
for his employer's assurance that he would be retained so long as his work was satisfactory.
Personnel manuals and employee handbooks have, however, been rejected as the basis for
legally binding modifications of the at will employment doctrine in other recent decisions. See,
e.g., Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 446 A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207
Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 73 Ill. App. 3d 117,
397 N.E.2d 443 (1979); Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976).
9. This principle was first enunciated in Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 273 Mass.
96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). Thereafter, it was adopted and followed by the California courts in
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) and in Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184,
344 P.2d 25 (1959) (employee fired for refusing to commit perjury at his employer's behest in
violation of a statutorily prohibited policy). In Suchodolski v.Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,
412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982), involving an accountant who was discharged after claim-
ing that his employer's accounting procedures were inconsistent with accepted accounting princi-
ples, the Michigan Supreme Court refused to recognize the tort of abusive or wrongful discharge
absent breach of a clearly defined statutory policy. Although New York, like Michigan, recog-
nizes a contractual cause of action based upon policy manuals (Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57
N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441 (1982)), New York's highest appellate court has
similarly refused to further alter the common law employment relationship without the express
guidance of the legislature. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461
N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983). In Murphy, also involving an accountant discharged over an
accounting procedure dispute, the court held "that recognition in New York State of tort liability
for what has become known as abusive or wrongful discharge should await legislative action." 58
N.Y.2d at 297, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 236, 448 N.E.2d at 90. See also Rawson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982); Givens v. Hixon, 275 Ark. 370, 631 S.W.2d 263 (1982); Gil v.
Metal Services Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. App.) cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (1982); Hans v.
National Living Centers, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App. 1982); Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc.,
422 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1982). In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974),
however, the New Hampshire Supreme Court recognized the tort of abusive discharge even absent
a declared public policy. The Monge court held that "a termination ... which is motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation -is not [in] the best interest of the economic system or
the public good and constitutes a breach of the employment contract." 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d
at 551.
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ingly, employees have recovered for the torts of abusive or retaliatory
discharge where they were fired for serving on juries,"l filing worker's
compensation claims,' 2 seeking employer compliance with consumer
protection laws,' 3 and "whistle blowing."14
This article will examine whether and under what circumstances
common law rights won by at will employees should be provided to
organized employees and whether the extension of common law pro-
tections after unionization can be harmonized with federal labor pol-
icy. Specifically, this article will consider the application of common
law contract and tort rights in two principal settings: where a labor
agreement is in effect and where one has not been executed or has
expired.
In the former instance, this article concludes that individual con-
tract or tort actions will seldom be justified. Employees covered by a
labor agreement already enjoy adequate protection under that agree-
ment. Furthermore, the extension of individual common law rights to
such employees will undermine the federal policy promoting the reso-
lution of labor disputes through collective bargaining. Conversely,
where unionized employees are not protected by an existing labor
agreement, this article concludes that individual common law rights
may be exercised only where there is no demonstrable interference with
the National Labor Relations Board's (hereinafter "Board") primary
jurisdiction or where the assertion of those rights does not unduly bur-
den the legitimate economic weapons of labor or management. In
these instances, individual common law rights must yield under federal
preemption principles.
11. Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 225
Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978). But see Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594
(Ala. 1980) (employer's motivation for discharging at will employee irrelevant notwithstanding
employee's claim that he was terminated for serving on a grand jury).
12. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 III. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central
Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644,
245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Lally v. CopyGraphics, 173 N.J. Super. 162, 413 A.2d 960 (App. Div.
1980); Brown v. Transcon Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). But see Segal v. Arrow Indus.
Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874
(Miss. 1981); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272 (1978); Hudson
v. Zenith Engraving Co., 273 S.C. 766, 259 S.E.2d 812 (1979). See Blevins v. General Electric Co.,
491 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Va. 1980), where court held employer's motivation for discharging at will
employee irrelevant notwithstanding employee's claim that he was terminated for filing workers'
compensation claim.
13. Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
14. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330
(1980); Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill. App. 3d 50, 406 N.E.2d 595 (1981). See
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (court recognized cause
of action for retaliatory discharge in case involving employee terminated for his efforts to correct
mislabeling of food).
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I. APPLICATION OF STATE COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS DURING
THE TERM OF A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
A. Individual Contract Rights
The union movement is predicated on the notion that employees
most effectively bargain for job improvements by joining together,
pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organiza-
tion.' 5 Once a union is designated as the bargaining representative by
a majority of employees, it becomes the exclusive bargaining agent.
The employer may no longer deal directly with individual employees. '
6
From that point forward, federal law prohibits individual contract
rights from being interposed to forestall collective bargaining obliga-
tions. ' 7 Upon execution of a collective bargaining agreement, the terms
of any pre-existing individual contracts merge into the labor agree-
ment,18 absent exceptional circumstances.' 9 The individual's power to
order his own relations is "extinguished" 20 and he implicitly agrees to
be bound by the bargain struck by his union.
2'
15. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a). See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967);
Taft Broadcasting Co., 264 N.L.R.B. 28, 111 L.R.R.M. 1340 (1982); Friederich Truck Service,
Inc., 259 N.L.R.B. 1294, 1299 (1982).
17. As the Supreme Court stated in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944):
Individual contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or
what their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by
the National Labor Relations Act looking to collective bargaining, nor to exclude the
contracting employee from a duly ascertained bargaining unit; nor may they be used to
forestall bargaining or to limit or condition the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement.
18. See, e.g., Klepacky v. Kraftco Corp., 80 L.R.R.M. 3144, 3146 (D.C. Conn. 1972) ("[t]he
national labor policy requires that a duly negotiated collective bargaining agreement should be
the sole determinant of [the employees] seniority status"); Pietrzykowski v Safie, 60 L.R.R.M.
2587, 2588 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965) ("the union contract superseded the individual contracts");
Quinlan v. Consolidated Edison Co., 237 N.Y.S.2d 745, 52 L.R.R.M. 2625, 2626 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1963) ("[tlhe collective bargaining agreement supersedes any individual agreements .. ").
19. There may be exceptional instances where the collective bargaining agreement itself may
provide for the continuation of individual contracts. See J. D. Alexander v. Standard Oil Co., 53
I11. App. 3d 690, 368 N.E.2d 1010 (5th Dist. 1977). In Alexander, the collective bargaining con-
tract between the union and the employer had expired, and the employer threatened to implement
his last best offer. Individual salesmen, who were members of the union, brought an action to
enforce their individual employment contracts. The individual actions were allowed to proceed,
despite the existence of a collective bargaining relationship. This result appears to have been
justified because the labor agreement expressly contemplated the continued existence of the indi-
vidual agreements both during and after the term of the labor agreement. Thus, the individual
contract between Standard and the individual agents, which granted the agents exclusive territo-
ries and provided that they would be paid commissions, "were meshed with the union negotiated
'Working Agreement,'" 368 N.E.2d at 1014. In these circumstances, "[t]he total relationship
between an individual agent and Standard" was deemed to be "governed by both agreements, but
if any inconsistencies occurred," the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement would con-
trol. Id.
20. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
21. Congress established this majoritarian principle "in full awareness that the superior
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Upon execution of the union agreement, the individual's exclusive
source of contract rights is found under that agreement. 22 He should
not be allowed to resurrect individual, common law contract rights
23
under either an express contract theory24 or an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.25 The contractual grievance machinery
culminating in binding arbitration contained in virtually all union
agreements is typically the sole avenue for redress of an alleged "un-
just" termination. 26
B. Individual Tort Rights
The union employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement
who is terminated for a reason "contrary to public policy" also should
be barred from seeking redress in a common law action. Since invaria-
bly the labor agreement expressly or implicitly prohibits discharge
without "just cause," and provides a dispute resolution mechanism, the
strength of some individuals or groups might be subordinated to the interest of the majority",
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975), and that
"[tihe complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected." Ford Motor Co.
v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Nevertheless, in vesting unions with broad authority "Con-
gress did not. . . authorize a tyranny of the majority over minority interests. . .[and] Congress
implicitly imposed upon it a duty fairly and in good faith to represent the interests of minorities
within the unit." Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 64. This duty of fair representation may be
invoked by individuals to prevent arbitrary union conduct. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182
(1967).
22. The exclusive basis for employee or union enforcement of the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement is § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Section
301 provides that: "suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ...may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties." Although suits to enforce labor
contracts under § 301 may be brought in state as well as federal court, such actions must be de-
cided "according to precepts of federal labor policy," rather than state law, "[since] [the] possibil-
ity that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and federal law
would inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration of
collective agreements." Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). More-
over, employees may not seek judicial enforcement of their individual rights under the collective
agreement without first seeking to exhaust their grievance and arbitration rights. See Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); Labor Board v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963). Direct judicial recourse against their union and employer is only available if the union fails
to process a grievance in good faith. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). This result is premised
upon the strong federal policy encouraging the use of "contract grievance procedures as a pre-
ferred method for settling disputes and stabilizing the 'common law' of the plant." Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653 (1965).
23. See supra note 18.
24. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.w.2d 880 (1980).
25. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 273 Mass. 94, 364 N.E.2d 1511 (1977),
and the cases cited supra note 9.
26. After exhausting his rights, the employee may sue under § 301 to set aside an adverse
arbitration award. Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195 (1962). However, the award will
be deemed conclusive unless the employee can establish that the award was tainted by the union's
failure to adequately represent him before the arbitrator. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554, 568 (1976). See infra note 43.
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employee should be required to exhaust this contractual remedy. As-
suming the arbitrator's award is fair and regular on its face, it should
be binding and exclusive.
This is not to say that no argument exists for allowing the unjustly
dismissed union employee to recover under a common law tort theory.
If his discharge contravenes a clearly defined state policy, the state's
interest in providing an independent common law action competes
with the federal interest in encouraging the timely resolution of labor
disputes through arbitration.27 Since state law is directly subverted by,
for example, the retaliatory discharge of an employee who files a valid
worker's compensation claim,28 state law arguably should provide a.
remedy to at will and union employees alike.
The Illinois appellate courts have split on this issue. The First and
Fourth District held that exhaustion of the contractual grievance ma-
chinery is not required 29 because the cause of action is grounded in
tort, rather than contract principles. These courts also reasoned that to
do otherwise would result in the anomalous award of punitive damages
to non-union employees while limiting union employees to compensa-
tory damages through arbitration.30
The opposite-and better-view is illustrated by the Third Dis-
trict's decision in Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. 31 Cook also involved
a union employee who was discharged allegedly in retaliation for filing
a worker's compensation claim. Relying upon the federal policy ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers Trilogy32 and the
broad discretion afforded arbitrators to construe the "just cause" re-
quirements in the bargaining agreement, the Third District found that
the dispute was plainly one which was arbitrable under the agree-
27. See United Parcel Service v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
28. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.4(h) (1975), where the Illinois legislature made it
unlawful for any employer to discriminate or to threaten to discriminate in any way because of an
employee's exercise of rights granted by the Workman's Compensation Act. Violation of the stat-
ute subjects an employer to criminal sanctions. In addition, a civil action in tort has been implied
by the courts. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 I11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
29. See Wyatt v. Jewel Tea Cos., 108 Ill. App. 3d 840, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1st Dist. 1982). See
also Deatrick v. Funk Seeds International, 109 IUl. App. 3d 998, 441 N.E.2d 669 (4th Dist. 1982)
where the court, adopting Wyatt, similarly held that exhaustion was not required.
30. Wyatt, 108 Ill. App. 3d at 389. Furthermore, it has been argued that reliance on the
collective bargaining agreement alone to protect the state's policy in furthering the right of work-
man's compensation claimants to pursue their claims is not adequate if, for example, a union
declines to arbitrate the claim. Note, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.-Illinois Courts Welcome Retalia-
tory Discharge Suits Under The Workman's Compensation Act, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 839.
31. 85 11. App. 3d 402, 407 N.E.2d 95 (3rd Dist. 1980).
32. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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ment.33 It rejected the claim that exhaustion was unnecessary because
punitive damages are unavailable in arbitration or because a retaliatory
discharge action is grounded in tort, not contract.
According to Cook, the cause of action for retaliatory discharge
afforded Illinois employees in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. 34 only protects
the terminable at will employee who is without other avenues of re-
course against his employer. Absent that protection, the at will worker
would otherwise be forced "to choose between continued employment
and the workmen's compensation legally due him."' 35 Kelsay was not
intended, the Cook court said, to apply to a union employee who is
protected by a just cause provision culminating in arbitration. This
employee, unlike his non-union counterpart, is not forced into sacrific-
ing his compensation benefits or losing his job. Under this view, the
state's interest in protecting employees from retaliatory discharges is
adequately insured by the collective bargaining agreement.
36
Clearly, the Cook decision represents a more faithful reading of
the policies underlying Kelsay and the federal policy encouraging col-
lective bargaining. The Seventh Circuit recently adopted Cook's read-
ing of Kelsay in Lamb v. Briggs Manufacturing.37 In Lamb, the court
observed that the retaliatory tort created in Kelsay was designed "to
spare employees the Hobson's choice of receiving Workmen's Compen-
sation or retaining a job, alternatives which are mutually exclusive only
in the absence of a third: grievance arbitration and a 'just cause' con-
tractual provision. ' 38 The unionized employee, in contrast, "may util-
ize the formidable tool of binding arbitration, and win reinstatement
and backpay. . .. ,,39 Moreover, the Lamb court found that Cook's
interpretation of Kelsay furthers "the public policy of facilitating or-
derly, bilateral industrial relations." 40
33. The court correctly noted that it was not necessary that the contract "specifically enumer-
ate retaliatory discharge as a grievance" to be arbitrable under the "just cause" provision. Arbi-
trators are authorized to determine whether any kind of termination meets the "just cause"
requirement of a contract. 85 Ill. App. 3d at 405, 407 N.E.2d at 98.
34. 74 Ill. 2d at 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
35. 85 Ill. App. 3d at 406, 407 N.E.2d at 98.
36. Id. at 407, 407 N.E.2d at 99.
37. 700 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1983).
38. Id. at 1094.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1095. The Illinois Supreme Court's post-Kelsay decision in Palmateer v. Interna-
tional Harvester Co., 85 I11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981) further supports the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion. Thus, as the Seventh Circuit observed in Lamb, "[in Palmateer, the Illinois Supreme
Court again underscored that the tort of retaliatory discharge 'is an exception to the general rule
that an 'at will' employment is terminable at any time/or any or no cause."' 700 F.2d at 1095
(emphasis in original).
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In sum, the alleged anomaly of depriving the union worker cov-
ered by a collective bargaining agreement of punitive damages which
are available to the non-union employee who is discharged in violation
of public policy must be weighed against the orderly and expeditious
employee remedy available through arbitration.4' On balance, the ex-
haustion requirement customarily applied to unionized employees
seeking to vindicate employment contract rights42 should also be ap-
plied where recovery for unjust discharge is sought under a tort
theory.
43
II. APPLICATION OF STATE COMMON LAW PROTECTIONS WHEN No
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT IS IN EFFECT
Whether a union employee can claim individual contract or tort
rights where no collective bargaining agreement exists poses a more
difficult problem than where a contract is in effect. There are two peri-
ods of time when the terms and conditions of employment of unionized
employees are not fixed by a labor agreement: (1) after a union wins an
41. Requiring unionized employees to utilize their contractual grievance machinery is also
consistent with the exhaustion requirement imposed on the non-union employee by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980),
in instances where a procedure for final and binding arbitration is made available to the non-
union employee under the employer's personnel policies. Thus, while granting, on the one hand,
enforceable contract rights to the at will employee based upon an employer's personnel manual,
the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the employer "can avoid the perils of jury assessment by
providing for an alternate method of dispute resolution," such as binding arbitration. 408 Mich.
at 624. In the State of Michigan at least, it appears that union and non-union employees alike
must exhaust alternative dispute resolution mechanisms provided by the employer prior to filing a
breach of contract or tort suit growing out of the employee's discharge.
42. The only significant exception to the exhaustion requirement has been in the equal em-
ployment area. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that a Title VII complainant is required to exhaust the grievance-arbitration
machinery of a collective bargaining agreement in light of Congress' intent through the legislative
scheme to provide aggrieved individuals multiple remedies. Thus, while the grievance procedure
contained in a collective agreement does not have to be exhausted in an equal employment case,
this result is mandated by Congress' desire to single out the equal employment area for special
protection. Absent evidence of an affirmative intent by the state legislature to provide multiple
forums in retaliatory discharge cases, the exhaustion requirement should be applied.
43. See discussion supra at note 26. An arbitrator's award in a retaliatory discharge case
should be granted the same degree of finality as any other arbitration award. Generally, a court is
not authorized to review the merits of an award and can only set it aside if it fails to "draw its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). Thus, so long as the union is faithful to its statutory
obligation to represent the grievant fairly and fully in that process and the procedures are fair and
regular, the arbitrator's award will be given finality by the courts. Cf. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v.
United Steelworkers of America, 263 F. Supp. 488 (D.C. Cal. 1967) (court vacated an award and
remanded the case for rehearing because the arbitrator refused to hear an important rebuttal
witness); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974), modfed on other grounds,
514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1975) (court vacated an award because the record revealed that the arbitra-
tor was biased).
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
election and up until the time the initial agreement is reached; and
(2) after expiration of an existing agreement but before the time the
parties agree on a new contract. Absent an executed agreement, the
concept of merger of rights may be inapplicable." Nonetheless, there
are circumstances where individual employee rights must yield to over-
riding federal labor law policies.
A threshold question is: does the mere fact of unionization extin-
guish existing individual common law contract and tort rights? Assum-
ing that it does not, is there any point on the continuum between
unionization and execution of an agreement when federal labor policy
overrides the common law? In J.. Case Co. v. NLRB,45 the Supreme
Court indicated, albeit in dicta, that individual contract rights are not
necessarily extinguished by the advent of a union. As the Court noted,
"[c]are has been taken in the opinions of the Court to reserve a field for
the individual contract, even in the industries governed by the National
Labor Relations Act, not merely as an act or evidence of hiring, but
also in the sense of a completely individually bargained contract.
'46
This language suggests that following a union's certification and
until the completion of the collective bargaining process a union em-
ployee is protected under both state and federal law. He may not only
reap the benefits achieved through collective bargaining but, until the
contract is finalized, may continue to assert the individual contract
rights he enjoyed before unionization. Conversely, the employer not
only remains at risk against individual contract claims but, because of
the union's exclusive representative status under federal law, he may
not even seek to negotiate changes in those terms directly with his em-
ployees. 47 Any such changes must be negotiated with the union.
Moreover, since federal law precludes the employer from making any
unilateral changes in employment conditions pending exhaustion of the
collective bargaining process, the terms of the individual employment
contracts must be maintained in full force and effect.
48
It is doubtful that this apparent inequity was perceived in 1944
when J I. Case was decided. The Court's principal concern was in
insuring that individual contract rights could not be improperly as-
44. See cases cited supra at note 18.
45. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
46. Id at 336.
47. See supra note 16. Once the union is certified, it becomes the exclusive representative of
all employees in the bargaining unit by virtue of § 9(a) of the Act. As a result, the employer is
legally precluded from dealing directly with employees to effect any change in the employment
terms. NLRB v. Alis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
48. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
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serted to undermine the process of collective bargaining. Similarly, the
Court was careful to assure that the employees enjoying individual
contract protections would not be unduly discouraged from their newly
gained right to organize. Subsequent to J . Case, however, the Act
has been construed to require employer maintenance of the status quo
until a lawful deadlock has been reached. Arguably, therefore, federal
law now adequately protects the individual and makes it unnecessary
for the states to extend common law protections to the union employee
even where a collective bargaining agreement is not yet effective. How-
ever, even though an employer may not unilaterally change such basic
employment terms as wages and associated fringe benefits during nego-
tiations, an employer would still be free under federal law to discipline
or discharge employees without just cause so long as his motive is not
tainted by anti-union animus.
In short, while the unionized employee is in less need than his
non-union counterpart of state law protection during the initial bar-
gaining process, protection from unjust discharge is not achieved by
federal law. It is unlikely that the courts will be persuaded that union-
ized employees must be denied the same rights as non-union employees
based solely upon their selection of a collective bargaining
representative.
If the enforcement of individual employment rights interferes with
the federal collective bargaining process, however, the states will be
precluded from providing a forum. This result is dictated by the doc-
trine of federal labor law preemption. The preemption doctrine rests
on the premise that Congress, in enacting the NLRA, established a
comprehensive national labor policy to obtain uniform administration
of the substantive rules and to avoid the "diversities and conflicts likely
to result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor
controversies. '49 Labor preemption was designed to preserve this uni-
form federal labor policy since "nothing could serve more fully to de-
feat the congressional goals underlying the Act than to subject . . . the
relationships it seeks to create to the concurrent jurisdiction of state
and federal courts free to apply the general local law." 50
The Supreme Court has established three distinct areas in which,
under the preemption doctrine established in San Diego Building
49. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971), quoting Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953).
50. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 286 (1971).
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Trades Council v. Garmon5l and Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations,5 2 a state generally may not act: (1) when it is fairly clear that
the activities which a state seeks to regulate are actually or arguably
protected by Section 753 of the National Labor Relations Act; (2) when
the conduct sought to be regulated is arguably an unfair practice under
section 854 of the Act;55 and (3) when, although neither "protected" by
section 7 nor "prohibited" by section 8, Congress intended that the con-
duct be "unregulated" by the states so that the parties may freely use
their legitimate economic weapons.5 6 Thus, states remain free to act
only where the conduct is neither "protected nor prohibited" and does
not involve an area Congress intended to be left "unregulated."
Two recent state cases illustrate the difficulty in the context of a
labor dispute in reconciling the extension of common law protections
with principles of federal preemption. The first, Belknap v. Hale,57
which was recently decided by the United States Supreme Court, 58 con-
cerns the alleged state law employment rights of strike replacements
who were terminated as the result of a strike settlement agreement ne-
gotiated between the union and employer. The second, Roberts v. Auto-
mobile Club of Michigan,59 involves an effort to enforce common law
contract rights which were allegedly breached by the employer during
the period of collective bargaining.
A. Enforcement of Individual Contract Rights During A Strike
In Belknap, the Supreme Court addressed, for the first time, an
51. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
52. 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
53. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to form, join or assist a labor organiza-
tion or to engage in other concerted and protected activities designed to achieve that result as well
as to engage in collective bargaining through their chosen representative.
54. Section 8 of the NLRA generally makes unlawful employer or union conduct which in-
terferes or restrains employees from exercising the rights granted them under Section 7 of the Act.
It also precludes employers or unions from discriminating against employees based upon their
union activity or refusal to engage in such activity and imposes a duty on both to engage in good
faith bargaining once a union is validly designated as the employees' bargaining agent. Finally,
under the provisions of § 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) unions are precluded from engaging in various kinds
of secondary boycott or other coercive activities which tend to interfere with employees freely
exercising their § 7 rights.
55. 359 U.S. at 244.
56. 427 U.S. at 140.
57. None of the opinions rendered by the Kentucky courts are reproduced in either an official
or unofficial reporter. References to these decisions shall cite from the Joint Appendix filed by
Belknap in the United States Supreme Court.
58. 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983).
59. Case No. 82-203-402-CZ (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich. May 1982), appeal docketed,
No. 66805 (Mich. Ct. App. April 12, 1983). The lower court's opinion and order are unpublished.
Reference thereto shall be to the slip opinion ("Slip op.").
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apparent conflict between competing state common law employment
rights and those arising under federal law. Following an unsuccessful
effort to reach agreement on a new contract, members of the Belknap
bargaining unit struck. When Belknap granted a wage increase for
union members who remained on the job, the union filed unfair labor
practice charges. The Board's Regional Director issued a complaint
against Belknap asserting that the unilateral increase violated Sections
8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) of the Act. During the strike, the company
also hired "permanent" replacements for its striking employees. Fol-
lowing a settlement conference convened by the Regional Director, the
parties entered into a strike settlement agreement. Under the terms of
that settlement the company agreed to reinstate 35 strikers per month
until all of the strikers were reinstated. To meet this obligation, the
company was forced to layoff some of the strike replacements.
60
The displaced replacements filed an action against the company in
Kentucky state court alleging fraud and breach of contract. 6' The trial
court granted the company's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that the action was preempted by federal law. In an unpub-
lished decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed. It held that
the action was not preempted for two reasons: first, because the com-
plained-of conduct-the layoff of the replacement workers-was not an
unfair labor practice;62 and second, because the conduct at issue was "a
merely peripheral concern" of the Board. 63 The court did not consider
whether the enforcement of the replacements' state contract rights in-
terfered with the employer's federally sanctioned power to hire or re-
frain from hiring replacements. Neither did the appeals court consider
whether the assertion of state power conflicted with the federal policy
granting a union broad authority to negotiate and contract for all bar-
gaining unit members, including strike replacements.
In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the
60. 103 S. Ct. at 3175-76.
61. The suit was filed by twelve of the laid off replacements. They alleged that the company
had induced them to enter into employment contracts by offering them "permanent employment"
even though the company never intended to hire permanent replacements. They also claimed that
the company had breached their employment contracts by subsequently entering into a strike
settlement agreement requiring their displacement. Brief for Petitioner at App. A 1-5, Belknap v.
Hale, 103 S. Ct. 3172 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Belknap Brief].
62. The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that the Company's alleged conduct did not vio-
late § 8(a)(3) of the Act, which prohibits "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employ-
ment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization." The Court reasoned that the replacements were "non-union workers who
sought full-time employment with [the Company] rather than membership in a particular labor
organization." Id. at App. C 3.
63. Id. at App. C 3-4.
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Kentucky Court of Appeals in what the concurring and dissenting jus-
tices termed "a difficult case." 64 The majority decision, written by Jus-
tice White, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
Stevens, and O'Connor, noted that the Court has preempted state regu-
lation of conduct which is arguably protected or prohibited as de-
scribed in Garmon, and state regulation of conduct that Congress
intended to be unregulated as described in Machinists.65 The majority
concluded that neither preemption doctrine applied.
Machinists dealt with the state's authority to prohibit a union-im-
posed ban on the performance of overtime work during negotiations in
order to pressure an employer to accept its economic demands. 66 The
majority opinion in Machinists noted that particular activity may be
"protected" by federal law even where it is not covered by the language
of Section 7 of the Act. An activity may also be "protected" when Con-
gress intends it to be left unregulated by any governmental power.
Congress' legislative purpose may dictate that certain activity, while
neither "protected" by Section 7 nor "prohibited" by Section 8, re-
mains insulated from state intrusion.67 Included within this category of
unregulated conduct are the legitimate self-help weapons of labor and
management which are "part and parcel of the process of collective
bargaining. ' 68 The Machinists Court found that the union's overtime
ban represented one such form of economic self-help. Although not
explicitly "protected" or "prohibited" by Congress, it constituted activ-
ity which Congress implicitly intended to be governed by the free play
of economic forces. By seeking to prohibit the union's overtime ban,
64. 103 S. Ct. at 3190.
65. Id. at 3177.
66. The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission found this tactic to be in violation of
state law and ordered the union to cease and desist. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, expressing
the views of six justices, the Court held that the State commission was preempted from regulating
this conduct. 427 U.S. at 141.
67. Id. See also Sears v. San Diego Carpenters, 436 U.S. at 199 n. 30:
Although it is clear that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over protected con-
duct, it is important to note that the word 'protected' may refer to two quite different
concepts: union conduct which the State may not prohibit and against which the em-
ployer may not retaliate because it is covered by § 7 or conduct which a State may not
prohibit even though it is not covered by § 7 of the Act. The Court considered protected
conduct in the latter sense in Machinists ...
68. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 149, quoting NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 495 (1960). Insurance Agents involved a union's refusal to bargain in good faith under
§ 8(b)(3) of the Act. During the negotiations, the union directed certain on-the-job harassing
tactics designed to pressure the employer to accede to the union's bargaining demands. These
activities were neither "protected" nor "prohibited" by the Act. The Supreme Court held that the
Board was precluded from inferring "bad faith" bargaining from these tactics. It concluded that
Congress intended that such economic weapons be free of any governmental regulation, including
regulation by the Board. 361 U.S. at 483 n. 6.
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the Court concluded that the state had improperly intruded into the
substantive aspects of the bargaining process and denied one party to
an economic contest a weapon that Congress intended to make
available. 6
9
Although concerning an economic weapon utilized by labor, Ma-
chinists makes clear that "self-help is of course also the prerogative of
the employer because he, too, may properly employ economic weapons
Congress meant to be unregulable. '' 70 Thus, an employer may respond
in a number of legitimate ways to an economic strike without violating
federal law. He may, for example, refuse to continue payment of
striker's insurance premiums 7' or utilize supervisors to maintain pro-
duction during the strike. 72 He also may lockout the strikers73 or con-
tract out all or part of his operation without union approval.74 Finally,
in response to an economic strike, an employer may threaten to or actu-
ally hire permanent strike replacements in order to either maintain pro-
duction or to exert pressure for a favorable contract settlement. 75
Where the strike is economic in origin, the utilization of any or all of
these economic weapons is sanctioned under federal law as part and
parcel of the process of free collective bargaining. Under the Machin-
ists rationale, therefore, state laws or regulations which prohibit or
limit the use of such permissible weapons are preempted unless Con-
gress affirmatively intended to tolerate such interference.
76
Belknap, with amicus support from the Board, the AFL-CIO, and
the United States Chamber of Commerce, argued in the Supreme
69. 427 U.S. at 155.
70. Id. at 147.
71. See Utility Workers of Boston Edison Co., 77 L.R.R.M. 2495 (lst Cir. 1971); Ace Tank
and Heater Co., 167 NLRB Dec. 663 (1967); Quality Castings Company, 139 N.L.R.B. 928 (1962);
Knickerbocker Plastic Co., Inc., 104 N.L.R.B. 514 (1953), enforced, 218 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1955).
72. Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449 (1972).
73. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
74. Southern California Stationers, 164 N.L.R.B. 1517, 1537 (1967); Empire Terminal Ware-
house Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359 (1965); Shell Oil Company, 149 N.L.R.B. 22 (1964); NLRB v. Ab-
bott Publishing, 331 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964).
75. In an economic strike, i.e., one called to extract economic concessions, an employer is,
under the Act, permitted to hire permanent replacements and need not at the strike's conclusion
displace the replacements to make room for the returning strikers. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967). Conversely, an employer violates the Act if, in response to a strike
caused or prolonged by its own unfair labor practices, it grants replacements a permanent job.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
76. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. State of New Jersey, 110 L.R.R.M. 2328, 2335
(N.J. Sup. Ct., May 3, 1982) (state statute prohibiting recruitment and hiring of strike replace-
ments is preempted by the NLRA as interfering with the balance of economic power between
labor and management); and People v. Federal Tool and Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549, 553-54, 344
N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (1975) (state statute requiring employers to notify prospective replacements that a
strike is in progress is preempted). See, infra, discussion of New York Telephone Company v.
New York State Department of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
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Court that the Kentucky courts were impermissibly attempting to regu-
late Belknap's use of the striker replacement weapon. The Court's ma-
jority did not question either Belknap's right to hire permanent
replacements or the principle "that the federal law intended to leave
the employer and the union free to use their economic weapons against
one another. ' 77 Nevertheless, the Court refused "to hold that either the
employer or the union is also free to injure innocent third parties with-
out regard to the normal rules of law governing those relationships.
'78
It reasoned that even if the allowance of damages to the strike replace-
ments would deter employers from making unconditional permanent
employment offers, this burden is really no greater than the burden
which exists under current law.79 Federal law already regulates an em-
ployer's right to offer and hire permanent strike replacements where the
strike is an unfair labor practice strike. According to the Court, since
"putative replacements would know that the proffered job is, in impor-
tant respects, non-permanent and may not accept employment for that
reason," 80 it could see no substantial difference if its ruling forced em-
ployers to condition their offers to replacements by stating the circum-
stances under which they could be fired. 8' In distinguishing Machinists
from Be/knap, the Court could find no basis for finding that suits by
"innocent" third parties would "burden" the employer's right to hire
permanent replacements under federal law. "Machinists," the Court
stated, "did not deal with solemn promises of permanent employment,
made to innocent replacements, that the employer was free to make
and keep under federal law."' 82 In an opinion wrought more with emo-
tion than careful analysis, the Court stated it could not "agree with the
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3178.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3179.
80. Id.
81. The Court also rejected the argument that a conditional offer promising permanent em-
ployment, subject only to a strike settlement or Board order mandating the strikers reinstatement,
would make the replacement a "temporary employee" subject to replacement by a striker at the
conclusion of an economic strike. While acknowledging that as a general rule a conditional offer
to replacements would be ineffective and require their displacement at the conclusion of an eco-
nomic strike, the Court argued that this requirement is designed to protect the striker, not the
replacement or the employer. Id. Further, if the conditional offer is limited to only the strike
settlement or unfair labor practice contingency, the Court found such arrangements "create a
sufficiently permanent arrangement to permit the prevailing employer [in an economic strike] to
abide by its promises." Id. Moreover, even if construed as a "conditional offer," the Court stated
that the refusal to fire replacements because of the commitments made in the course of an eco-
nomic strike would not be unlawful since there was "legitimate and substantial justification" for
that refusal under the rationale in NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380 (1967). 103
S. Ct. at 3179 n. 8.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 3181.
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dissent that Congress intended such a lawless regime. 83
In also rejecting the employer's Garmon preemption argument, the
Court relied on three post-Garmon decisions: Linn v. United Plant
Guard Workers of America,84 Farmer v. United Brotherhood of
Carpenters,85 and Sears Roebuck and Co. v. San Diego District Council
of Carpenters .86 Each of these cases involved activity violating com-
mon law tort or property rights which, although "arguably prohibited"
by the Act, also touched interests which were "deeply rooted" in local
feelings. Linn, a common law defamation action,87 was the first case
which signaled a departure from Garmon. It was followed by Farmer,
an action to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 8 and later by Sears, where the employer sought to enjoin peace-
ful union picketing under the state's trespass laws.89 These common
law actions were deemed not preempted under the "arguably prohib-
ited" branch of Garmon. As the Supreme Court explained in these de-
cisions, a strict application of Garmon's principles is not required where
83. Id. at 3178.
84. 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
85. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
86. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
87. In Linn, an assistant manager of Pinkerton's National Detective Agency filed suit in state
court against a union and two of its officers alleging that the defendants had circulated a defama-
tory statement about him in violation of state law. It was conceded that if unfair labor practice
charges had been filed the Board may have found that the Union violated § 8 of the Act by
intentionally circulating false statements during an organizational campaign. In addition, the
statements could have resulted in the election being set aside.
88. In Farmer, a member of the union engaged in an intra-union political dispute with union
officials, sued in state court alleging he was subjected to a campaign of personal abuse and harass-
ment, and alleging that the union discriminatorily refused to refer him for employment through its
exclusive hiring hall.
89. In Sears, the union established picket lines on privately owned sidewalks adjacent to the
Sears store. Following a demand by Sears to remove the pickets and a refusal by the union, Sears
filed suit in state court against the continuing trespass. Although the legality of the picketing was
unclear as a matter of federal law, the Court assumed for purposes of its decision that the picket-
ing arguably may have violated federal law under § 8 of the Act. The Supreme Court noted that a
stricter standard would be applied to state regulation of conduct "protected" by the Act as op-
posed to "prohibited" conduct. 436 U.S. at 200. The Court nonetheless upheld the state's power
to enjoin the trespass even if, as the Court assumed, the union's prohibition may have been pro-
tected under § 7 of the Act. This potential encroachment on the Board's primary jurisdiction was
permitted because Sears, the aggrieved party, had no means for directly obtaining a Board ruling
on the legality of the picketing. Id. at 202. The only orderly means for obtaining a Board ruling
was if the union filed an unfair labor practice charge in response to Sears' demand that it remove
its pickets, a course which the union chose not to pursue. Sears was thus left with only three
choices: to permit the pickets to remain; to forcefully evict the pickets; or to seek protection of the
state's trespass laws, the only option available to Sears to seek an orderly resolution of the dispute.
Thus, under Sears, where the aggrieved party has no means for securing a Board determination
regarding the protected nature of the conduct and where the party who has such means fails to
invoke the Board's processes, state courts will not be denied jurisdiction even if the conduct is
arguably protected and even if the state court is required to decide issues otherwise within the
Board's primary jurisdiction.
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each of the following requisites is met: (1) the underlying conduct,
such as defamation or trespass, is unprotected by the NLRA, thus pos-
ing little risk of state regulation of conduct which Congress affirma-
tively intended to protect; (2) there is an overriding state interest that is
"deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility;" and (3) there is little
risk that the state action will interfere with the Board's primary juris-
diction in insuring the uniform administration of national labor
policy. 90
Since none of these cases involved activity "protected" under the
Act, but did involve activity "deeply rooted" in state interests, the criti-
cal focus was whether state enforcement would interfere with the
Board's primary jurisdiction in assuring a uniform administration of
the Act. Because the state courts in each case were considering issues
different from those which either were or would have been considered
by the Board, state actions were allowed to proceed since no undue
interference with the Board's jurisdiction would result. In comparison,
in Operating Engineers Local 926 v. Jones, 91 the Court found pre-
empted a state common law claim based upon a union's alleged tor-
tious interference with a supervisor's contract rights. Unlike Linn,
Farmer, and Sears, the Court concluded this action interfered with the
Board's primary jurisdiction under federal law since the state claim was
"the same in a fundamental respect" to that which the Labor Board
would consider.92 Where, as in Jones, the state controversy is funda-
mentally similar to issues which the Board could resolve, the state is
preempted. Where, as in Linn,93 Farmer, 94 and Sears,95 "the contro-
versy . . . is . . .different from . . . that which could have been, but
90. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 298, citing Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. at 61-62.
91. 103 S. Ct. 1453 (1983).
92. The issue in Jones was whether a supervisor excluded from the Act's protections could
sue in state court based upon the union's alleged tortious interference with his state contract rights.
In Jones, the court concluded that a fundamental part of the state law claim was whether the
union actually caused his discharge and was responsible for the employer's contract breach.
"[Tihis same crucial element must be proved to make out a § 8(b)(l)(B) case: the discharge must
be shown to be the result of Union influence." 103 S. Ct. at 1462.
93. In Linn, the Court concluded that the issues which could be brought in each forum dif-
fered because the malicious publication of libelous statements does not constitute an unfair labor
practice: "While the Board might find that an employer or union violated § 8 by deliberately
making false statements, or that the issuance of malicious statements require[d] that. . .[an elec-
tion) be set aside, it looks only to the coercive or misleading nature of the statements rather than
their defamatory quality. The injury that the statement might cause to an individual's reputation
...has no relevance to the Board's function." 383 U.S. at 63.
94. The Court in Farmer likewise found the issues before the state court to be different from
those which would have been considered by the Board since, "[wihether the statements or conduct
of the [Union] also caused [the member] severe emotional distress and physical injury would play
no role in the Board's disposition of the case, and the Board could not award [the member] dam-
ages for pain, suffering, or medical expenses." 430 U.S at 304. Additionally, the state court could
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was not presented to the Labor Board," 96 the state's power need not
yield to the NLRB's primary unfair labor practice jurisdiction.
The Belknap Court found that, even though Belknap's offers of
permanent employment were arguably unfair labor practices, the state
misrepresentation claim created little risk of interference with the
Board's exclusive area of jurisdiction. While questions concerning
whether the strike was an unfair labor practice strike and whether the
offer of permanent employment to the replacements was forbidden by
federal law were matters for the Board, the Court noted that these de-
terminations "would be concerned with the impact on strikers and not
with whether the employer deceived replacements." 97 Thus, the major-
ity observed that the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board
could only be invoked to remedy any injustice to the strikers. Only the
Kentucky courts, which had a strong interest in protecting its citizens
from misrepresentations, could remedy the alleged injustice done to the
replacements. 98
The Belknap Court similarly found that the replacements' breach
of contract suit could be maintained without infringing on the Board's
remedial powers. It acknowledged that the finding of an unfair labor
practice by the Board would require reinstatement of the strikers, an
obligation the state could not disturb.99 However, the employer had
precluded any such adjudication when it settled the strike and rein-
stated the strikers. Moreover, even if the employer had not settled the
strike and the Board had ordered reinstatement of what it ultimately
determined were unfair labor practice strikers, only specific perform-
ance of the employer's promise of permanent employment to the
replacements would be barred. The employer would not be immunized
from a damage award in state court to remedy its breach.1°°
Concurring, Justice Blackmun chastized the majority for refash-
ioning the NLRA to conform to the substance of Kentucky contract
and tort law, and for failing to show deference to the Board by address-
adjudicate the state tort action without "resolution of the 'merits' of the underlying labor dispute."
Id.
95. In Sears, the Court concluded similarly that the issues before the state and federal forums
were distinct: "If Sears had filed a charge, the federal issue would have been whether the picket-
ing had a recognitional or work reassignment objective. . . . Conversely, in the state action,
Sears only challenged the location of the picketing; whether picketing had an objective proscribed
by federal law was irrelevant to the state claim." 436 U.S. at 198.
96. Id. at 197.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 3183.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3183-84.
100. Id. at 3184.
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ing the reasonableness of the Board's position.' 0 ' Justice Blackmun en-
dorsed the Board's position that an employer must be able to promise
replacements permanent employment to maintain operations during a
strike. In his view, the majority's conclusion that the employer could
refuse to reinstate strikers at the end of an economic strike even if the
replacements were told they could later be displaced as a result of a
strike settlement agreement or Board unfair labor practice order, was
not consistent with Board law.'0 2 Nevertheless, while acknowledging
that "the question is close,"' 0 3 Justice Blackmun concluded that en-
forcement of the employer's promises to the replacements in state court
did not infringe upon the employer's right to hire permanent strike
replacements. Since federal law sanctions the hiring of permanent
replacements, granting a state remedy "is the only result consistent with
the promises' federal purpose."0 4 Moreover, unlike the union's refusal
to work overtime in Machinists, Justice Blackmun reasoned that the
obligations here were made to "third parties."' 0 5 Machinists, in con-
trast, involved "the clash of weapons used by employer and union
against one another."1°6 Despite his agreement with the result reached
by the majority, Justice Blackmun nevertheless remarked that congres-
sional regulation of this "complex three-way struggle" is desirable. 10 7
The dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall and Justice Powell, termed the case "unusual" and "novel" be-
cause it was brought by former employees who were hired to replace
union members. 0 8 Emphasizing that an integral component of the col-
lective bargaining process lies in the use of economic pressure by both
employers and unions to achieve bargaining goals, Justice Brennan
found the replacements' complaint to be preempted because "these
claims go to the core of federal labor policy.' °9 Justice Brennan ap-
101. Id. at 3184-85.
102. Id. at 3185 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As Justice Blackmun observed, an employer may
refuse to reinstate economic strikers only by showing "legitimate and substantial business justifi-
cations." Id. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967). The employer has the ability to refuse reinstatement where
it has promised replacements permanent employment only because a promise of permanency is
necessary "to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant" by the strikers.
103 S. Ct. at 3185, quoting NLRB v. Mackey Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). In Justice Blackmun's
opinion, the Board's conclusion that this purpose is served only by an unconditional promise of
permanency was reasonable. 103 S. Ct. at 3185.
103. Id. at 3186.
104. Id. at 3187.
105. Id. at 3188.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3189.
108. Id. at 3190 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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plied Garmon principles in preempting the breach of contract claim
and Machinists principles in preempting the misrepresentation claim.
Because federal law would have required the reinstatement of the
strikers in the event there were unfair labor practices, Justice Brennan
observed that Belknap's decision to breach its contracts was "arguably
required" by federal law. To avoid conflicting state and federal regula-
tory schemes, he concluded that Garmon preemption was therefore
necessary. He considered immaterial the fact that the replacements
may only have desired damages as opposed to specific performance be-
cause, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Garmon, "'regulation can
be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief.' "110
Addressing the replacements' claim of misrepresentation, Justice
Brennan noted that the right to hire replacements for strikers is an eco-
nomic weapon an employer may use to combat the union's ability to
strike, and part of the balance of economic power struck by the Act
between the competing parties to a collective bargaining relation-
ship."' He concluded that the replacements' misrepresentation claim
was preempted under Machinists because it would substantially burden
an employer's right to use its economic replacement weapon by expos-
ing employers to substantial financial liability. This result was espe-
cially true, Justice Brennan observed, because the question whether a
strike is an economic or unfair labor practice strike often is unclear
when an employer replaces strikers."
t 2
If nothing else, the Court's three opinions in Belknap reveal great
uncertainty over the application of state employment rights in the face
of competing federal rights. While Belknap's peculiar factual situation,
involving the rights of unrepresented third parties, may leave the case
with little precedential significance, close analysis indicates that the re-
sult is completely compatible with the preemption principles developed
110. 103 S. Ct. at 3194, quoting Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247. According to Justice Brennan, the
potential of such conflicting regulation of conduct was exacerbated in this case because the em-
ployer faced with potential liability for discharging workers he had hired to replace striking em-
ployees is less likely to enter into a settlement agreement calling for the dismissal of unfair labor
practice charges and the reinstatement of strikers. Rather than risk facing a breach of contract
claim in state court, the employer is likely to litigate the unfair labor practice charges while keep-
ing the replacements, thus undermining "the strong federal interest in ending strikes and in set-
tling labor disputes." 103 S. Ct. at 3194 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry
Goods, 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
111. 103 S. Ct. at 3191, 3196.
112. Id. at 3197. Justice Brennan, like Justice Blackmun, also noted that the majority's re-
quirement that employers condition their offers of permanent employment might render the
replacements non-permanent under federal law and require the reinstatement of strikers regard-
less of the nature of the strike. Id. at 3198.
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in Machinists and Garmon. The gravamen of the replacements' com-
plaint in Belknap was that the employer failed to fulfill his commitment
to give them permanent jobs regardless of the strike's outcome. The
majority seems to have assumed that the replacements' claim interfered
with the employer's strike replacement weapon, but excused this inter-
ference because Congress could never have intended to permit employ-
ers to deceive innocent third parties.11 3 If, however, the strike was
economic, the employer was privileged under federal law to make such
commitments." 14 He could also refuse to displace the replacements to
make room for the returning economic strikers." 15 Thus, it is difficult
to see, as Justice Blackmun indicated in his concurrence, how state law
enforcement of the employer's promises to the replacements impinges
upon his use of the strike replacement weapon. If anything, it comple-
ments and reinforces the power granted him under federal law.
If a conflict exists, therefore, it arises under the "prohibited"
branch of Garmon. Under the post-Garmon decisions already dis-
cussed, preemption is warranted only if the federal and state claims are
fundamentally similar.'1 6 Where they are, there is a substantial risk
that the assertion of state jurisdiction will interfere with the Board's
primary jurisdiction to resolve such controversies and thus impede its
administration of national labor policy.
All justices recognized that Belknap's conduct in hiring the strike
replacements was arguably an unfair labor practice. While an em-
ployer may hire permanent replacements for economic strikers, such
conduct violates the Act if the strike is either caused or prolonged by
the employer's unfair labor practices." t7 Therefore, if, as the Board's
113. Concurring, Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, observed that enforcement of the em-
ployer's promise would be consistent with the employer's federal rights: "it appears to me that
state enforcement of promises of permanent employment through damage awards for breach of
contract and misrepresentation is consistent with the nature of the federal weapon itself." 103 S.
Ct. at 3188, n. 4 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
114. See supra note 75.
115. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967). In an economic strike,
displaced strikers need only be placed on a recall list and given priority in recall rights over new
hires. Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 105 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
116. See, e.g., Local 926, Operating Engineers v. Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 1462.
117. An unfair labor practice strike is one called in response to an employer's violation of the
Act. If, during an economic strike, an employer commits what the Board considers to be an unfair
labor practice and the union continues to strike beyond its normal duration, the strike is converted
to an unfair labor practice strike and the strikers become unfair labor practice strikers. If, at the
conclusion of the strike, they make an unconditional offer to return to work, they are entitled to
immediate reinstatement even if it requires displacing the strike replacements hired after the strike
was converted to an unfair labor practice strike. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 720,
729 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964). See also Stewart, Conversion ofStrikes." Economic
to Unfair Labor Practice, 45 VA. L. REV. 1322 (1959).
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complaint in Belknap alleged, the initial economic strike was converted
to and prolonged by the company's unfair labor practices,I" Belknap
would have been required to discharge the replacements to make room
for the returning strikers." 9 Belknap, therefore, argued before the
Supreme Court that state enforcement of the replacements' claims
could conceivably force it to act in contravention of federal law.
120
Thus, even though the state and federal issues do not appear to be
"fundamentally similar,"'12 a substantial conflict is arguably created
between the state court remedy and the Board's primary jurisdiction.
As the majority recognized, however, that conflict may be more
apparent than real. If the strike in Belknap was an unfair labor prac-
tice strike, the employer plainly had no federal right to promise perma-
nency to the replacements. In fact, it was prohibited from doing so
under federal law. Thus, the enforcement of the replacements' rights is
not generally incompatible with federal policy or the primacy of the
Board's jurisdiction unless the state court ordered Belknap to reinstate
the replacements. 22 To the extent reinstatement relief was ordered,
there would be a direct conflict between any Board ordered remedy or
any voluntary Board settlement. As recognized by the majority, so
long as the state court limits its relief to damages 123 and refrains from
considering the appropriateness of any reinstatement order, 24 a direct
118. During the strike a number of unfair labor practice charges were filed against Belknap.
Following an investigation, the Board's Regional Director issued a complaint alleging that Bel-
knap had unlawfully instituted a wage increase during the strike without notice to the union.
Belknap Brief, supra note 61, at 3 and App. F-5. Therefore, under the Board's position, the initial
economic strike was converted to an unfair labor practice strike by virtue of the Company's unfair
labor practice.
119. Failure to provide for the unconditional reinstatement of unfair labor practice strikers,
regardless of an employer's motivation in making representations of permanent replacement sta-
tus to striker replacements, is prohibited by §§ 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) of the Act. Mastro Plastics
Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); NLRB v. Top Mfg. Co., 594 F.2d 223, 225 (9th Cir. 1979).
120. "Allowing a state claim by striker replacements whose layoff is required by federal law
would present a direct conflict in state and federal regulation of the same activity. Belknap
Brief, supra note 61, at 12.
121. The issue before the Board would have been whether the strike was converted to an
unfair labor practice strike by virtue of the employer's unfair labor practices. If so, the employer
could have been required to reinstate the strikers even if it required terminating the replacements.
In comparison, the state court would have no concern with the nature of the strike under federal
law. Its concern would be limited to whether representations of permanent employment were
made and, if so, whether this constituted an actionable right under state law.
122. Failure to reinstate an unfair labor practice striker upon an unconditional offer to return
to work would subject the employer to backpay liability commencing from the date of the refusal.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1957); Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 331 F.2d
720 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 888 (1964).
123. The laid-off strike replacements in Belknap each sought $500,000 in compensatory and
punitive damages. Belknap Brief, supra note 61, App. A 5-6.
124. It may be that the Belknap plaintiffs were not entitled to reinstatement under their state
law claims of fraud and breach of contract. If they ultimately prevailed in their claims, money
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conflict with federal policy is avoided. 25
The avoidance of such a conflict seems desirable. Otherwise, the
following anomalous circumstance could result: An employer legiti-
mately hiring permanent replacements for economic strikers would be
liable for firing the replacements; conversely, an employer illegiti-
mately hiring the same replacements for unfair labor practice strikers
could escape liability. Thus, as noted by the Court's majority, "[i]t is
not easy to grasp why the employer who settles a purely economic
strike. . . and fires permanent replacements to make way for returning
strikers could be made to respond in damages; yet the employer who
violates the labor laws is for that reason insulated from damages liabil-
ity when it discharges replacements to whom it has promised perma-
nent employment."'
126
Even if preemption is not required under either the Machinists or
Garmon doctrines, another fundamental reason why state jurisdiction
must yield was glossed over or left unaddressed by all three opinions.
The replacements in Belknap were displaced as the result of a fully
negotiated strike settlement between the union and employer.' 27 This
factor appears to mandate dismissal of the state claims. As noted ear-
lier, federal labor policy rests on the premise that once a majority of
employees select a union as their representative, the individual bar-
gaining unit member's power to order his own relationship with his
employer is either extinguished or subordinated to the collective inter-
damages would presumably provide a complete and adequate remedy. As a general matter,
courts are loath to order a party to specifically perform its part of a bargain where money damages
are available. See, e.g., SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 405-06 (2d ed. 1965).
125. The Court stated that "even had there been no settlement and the Board had ordered
reinstatement of what it held to be unfair labor practice strikers, the suit for damages for breach of
contract could still be maintained without in any way prejudicing the jurisdiction of the Board or
the interest of the federal law in insuring the replacement of strikers." 103 S. Ct. at 3184.
126. Id. at 3182 n. 12. Under the analysis suggested here, the employer would be forced to
hire permanent strike replacements at his peril. But this is always true even under the Act's
processes. If the employer makes the wrong decision and refuses to reinstate the strikers at the
strike's conclusion on the assumption that the strike is exclusively an economic one, he may none-
theless be responsible for a substantial backpay liability to the strikers if the Board determines that
the strike was caused or prolonged by the employer's unfair labor practices. The only additional
risk imposed under the foregoing analysis is the risk of paying back pay to the permanent replace-
ments also where, as a result of such decision, he is required to terminate the replacements or
elects to terminate them as a result of a strike settlement. In the latter instance, however, as
discussed infra, text accompanying notes 128-134, he may escape liability under a different legal
theory.
127. The strike settlement agreement provided that 35 strikers would be reinstated each month
until all of the strikers had been offered reinstatement. In order to reinstate the strikers in accord-
ance with the strike settlement agreement, the company laid off some of the replacements and
informed them that they would be considered for reemployment once all of the strikers had been
recalled. Belknap Brief, supra note 61, App. E 3-4.
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est of all members of the unit.128 Moreover, once a union negotiates an
agreement, any pre-existing individual rights arising under state law
are merged into the collectively bargained agreement.1
29
In negotiating the terms of the strike settlement agreement, the
union in Belknap appears to have bargained away the replacements'
individual contract rights. In exchange, the union presumably
achieved benefits for its entire bargaining membership, strikers and
non-strikers alike. Since, under federal law, a union is considered the
bargaining agent both for the strikers and their replacements, 30 the
strike settlement superseded any enforceable promises to the contrary
under state law.
Furthermore, as noted in the Court's dissenting opinion, the en-
forcement of the replacements' state court rights would conflict with the
federal policy fostering the settlement of strikes and other labor dis-
putes;' 3' strike settlement agreements are not only enforceable under
federal law to the same extent as other collective bargaining agree-
ments, but are encouraged under the Act's policy of minimizing disrup-
tions to interstate commerce.' 32  Allowing a state action in these
circumstances could frustrate and undermine the parties' ability to ami-
cably settle their labor disputes.
33
In granting state court relief, the Court appeared to assume that
the replacements would otherwise be left without any recourse. That
128. See discussion, supra, and text accompanying notes 15-26, and cases cited therein.
129. See discussion, supra, and text accompanying note 18, and cases cited therein. See also
supra note 8.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976); Pennco, Inc., 250 N.L.R.B. 716, 718 n.17 (1980), enforced, No.
80-1684 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1982), cert. denied sub. nontn, Pennco, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 355
(1982); C.H. Guenther & Son, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1203 (1969), enforced, 427 F.2d 983, 987
(5th Cir.), ceri. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Getlan Iron Works, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 864, 867 (1969).
The union must therefore take the interests of both groups into account in entering into a strike
settlement agreement. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967).
131. The Board issues nearly 8,000 unfair labor practice complaints a year. Over 82% of these
complaints are resolved through voluntary settlement. 45 NLRB ANNUAL REPORT 6, 244 (1980).
The Act encourages voluntary settlement agreements. Settlement promotes the Act's policy favor-
ing the peaceful and expeditious resolution of labor disputes and promotes the Board's regulatory
mission by decreasing the number of cases that must be resolved through prolonged and costly
litigation. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1944); Poole Foundry & Machine
Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 740, 742-43 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952). To the extent
state courts are permitted to impose remedies which are inconsistent with the terms of an agree-
ment reached by the parties to a labor dispute, the Board's settlement function is frustrated and
undermined.
132. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1944); Poole Foundry & Machine Co.
v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 740, 742-43 (4th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
133. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions noted that an employer is now less likely to
enter into a settlement agreement calling for the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges and for
the reinstatement of strikers. 103 S. Ct. at 3189 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 3194 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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void could have been fulfilled under federal labor law without opening
the state court to a potentially intrusive damage action. Under estab-
lished federal labor law principles the union must take the interests of
both the strikers and the replacements into account in entering into a
strike settlement agreement. Relief was available to the strikers either
in federal court or before the NLRB if the replacements could have
demonstrated a violation of the union's duty to represent all bargaining
unit employees fairly. While this may have been difficult, the replace-
ments' burden would have been no different than the burden imposed
on other disgruntled bargaining unit members who contend their indi-
vidual rights have been improperly bargained away.
134
B. Enforcement Of Individual Contract Rights During The
Negotiating Process
In contrast to the fact pattern illustrated in Belknap, the Roberts
case involved a direct and substantial intrusion upon an employer's ex-
ercise of a legitimate economic bargaining weapon. Furthermore, un-
like Belknap, Roberts involved the application of that weapon vis-d- vis
the Union and its members, not "innocent third parties." In Roberts,
the parties engaged in protracted and unsuccessful negotiations to forge
an initial collective bargaining agreement after the union's selection as
bargaining agent. Primarily as a result of the employees' resistance to
proposed tighter production standards for commissioned sales persons,
impasse was reached. Thereafter, the employer unilaterally imple-
mented its proposed standards. Roberts and other employees were de-
moted or dismissed for failing to meet the new sales quota.
Neither Roberts nor his union filed charges with the NLRB alleg-
ing that the unilateral changes were an unfair labor practice. Instead,
Roberts joined with other aggrieved employees and filed suit in state
court. 135 They alleged, in light of the Michigan Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield,136 that their dismissals
were in violation of their employer's alleged promise not to terminate
or demote them except for just cause. The Automobile Club attempted
to dismiss the suit on federal preemption grounds. The state circuit
court in Roberts discussed both the Garmon and the Machinists
branches of the preemption doctrine. The court concluded that neither
134. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also supra note 21.
135. See supra note 59.
136. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980). See supra note 7, and the accompanying text
discussing Toussaint.
COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF UNION EMPLOYEES
preemption principle was applicable and assumed jurisdiction over the
employees' Toussaint claims.
The court acknowledged that the employer's conduct in unilater-
ally implementing tighter production standards during the bargaining
process was conceivably "prohibited" by the Act.1 37 For example, if
the production standards were implemented before a genuine impasse
was reached or in the course of bad faith negotiations, the employer
would have violated its federal bargaining obligations. During this in-
terim period when no collective bargaining agreement is in effect, the
employer and the union have a reciprocal obligation to bargain in good
faith. 138 The employer is obligated on its part to maintain without
change all employment conditions in effect until all reasonable efforts
to reach an agreement have been exhausted. 139 This would include any
and all individual employment conditions, including those considered
to be contractually protected under state law. The only exception to
this requirement arises if and when an impasse results following good
faith negotiations. In that event, the employer is permitted under fed-
eral law to unilaterally implement its last, best offer."4° This is one of
the arsenal of economic weapons available to employers to force a sat-
isfactory settlement and to counterbalance the union's right to strike.
In Roberts, the Automobile Club's action in unilaterally imple-
menting the new production standards served as the basis for a com-
mon law action. However, that same conduct could have but was not
used as the basis for the filing of unfair labor practice charges. Despite
this apparent overlap between state and federal claims, the Roberts
court nonetheless found that preemption was not required under
Garmon.
Relying upon the Linn, Farmer, and Sears decisions previously
discussed, the court found that the state contract action created little
risk of interference with the federal regulatory scheme. It reasoned that
137. Roberts, slip op. at 8.
138. Sections 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act impose a mutual obligation on the employer
and union to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. These sections also require that both parties execute a
written contract incorporating the terms of any agreement reached. The obligation to bargain in
good faith does not, however, require that either party agree to the other's proposals or make any
concessions. See, e.g., H. K. Porter v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
139. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
See, e.g., Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 59 (1964) ("after the parties have bargained to an
impasse, that is after negotiating in good faith they apparently have exhausted the prospects of
concluding an agreement, the employer is free to institute by unilateral action changes which are
in line with or which are no more favorable than those he offered or approved in the negotiations
preceding the impasse").
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had Roberts' union filed an unfair labor practice charge challenging
the implementation of the minimum performance standards as violat-
ing the employer's bargaining obligation under section 8(a)(5) of the
Act, the Board's inquiry would only focus on whether a bonafide good
faith impasse had been reached in the negotiations prior to implemen-
tation of the standards. Conversely, the state action "would primarily
focus on the terms and conditions of employment as originally agreed
upon. . .[and] would revolve on whether the original agreement em-
bodied any promise by the employer not to discharge . .. [Roberts]
...without cause."' 4' Therefore, under the Supreme Court's "argua-
bly prohibited" standards the Roberts court found that preemption of
the employees' common law contract rights was not required.
While Roberts may be correct under the "arguably prohibited"
branch of Garmon as it stood at the time Roberts was handed down,
142
its finding that preemption is unwarranted under the "unregulated"
prong of preemption analysis articulated in Machinists and Belknap is
open to serious question. The Roberts court acknowledged that the
economic weapons of labor and management intended by Congress to
be left unregulated are protected against state interference. Nonethe-
less, the Court attempted to distinguish Machinists on the ground that
its holding was limited to "state regulations which directly curtail the
use of economic weapons, such as self help" as opposed to the neutral
common law right asserted in Roberts.143 This alleged dichotomy be-
tween a neutral law and a law directly regulating the use of economic
141. Roberts, slip op. at 13.
142. In view of the Supreme Court's most recent discussion of Garmon in Jones, Roberts'
finding that preemption is unwarranted under the "arguably prohibited" branch of Garmon may
be incorrect. A "crucial element" of both an action brought in state court under Toussaint and an
action brought before the Board alleging bad faith bargaining under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act is
whether or not the disputed production standards are fair. 103 S. Ct. at 1462. In state court, the
employees in Roberts are arguing that the production standards violate their individual "just
cause" contracts because the standards are unreasonably stringent. By the same token, in a Sec-
tion 8(a)(5) proceeding the Board would also examine the fairness of the production standards in
assessing the employer's conduct at the bargaining table. See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co.,
205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953) ("if the Board is not to be blinded by
empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining, it must take some cognizance
of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an employer during the course of negotiations").
Accord, NLRB v. F. Strauss & Son, Inc., 536 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1976); Kayser-Roth Hosiery Co.
v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 701, 702-03 (6th Cir. 1970); Alba-Waldensian, Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 695 (1967),
enforced, 404 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1968). Inasmuch as the issue of production standards was the
central and continuing area of disagreement between the parties, the employer would not have
been permitted under the Act to insist to impasse on unreasonable standards. Thus, both a Tous-
saint action and a § 8(a)(5) proceeding would largely revolve around whether the standards are
fair. Because "this same crucial element" must be addressed in both proceedings, it may be that,
under Jones, there is preemption in Roberts under the arguably prohibited branch of Garmon.
143. Roberts, slip op. at 16.
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weapons was, however, rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court in
New York Telephone Company v. New York State Department of La-
bor,144 concerning the state's authority to award unemployment com-
pensation benefits to strikers. This decision was neither discussed, nor
cited, by the Roberts court.
In New York Telephone, a sharply divided Court found that a New
York law awarding unemployment compensation benefits to strikers
was not preempted. 45 Writing for the Court's plurality, Justice Ste-
vens, in an opinion joined by Justice White and Rehnquist, acknowl-
edged that New York's policy in awarding unemployment
compensation to strikers did alter the economic balance between labor
and management by helping to prolong the union's strike beyond its
normal duration.1 46  The plurality nonetheless found Machinists, and
its earlier decision in Morton applying the unregulated branch of pre-
emption analysis, 47 to be inapplicable. First, unlike Machinists, which
involved a direct regulation of the parties' economic weapons, 48 the
statute at issue in New York Telephone was regarded as a "neutral law"
which only indirectly benefited one of the parties to a labor dispute.
While conceding that this alone was "not a sufficient reason to exempt
it from preemption," this factor, the plurality said, made it more diffi-
cult to infer a congressional intent to deprive the states of their tradi-
tional authority in this field.' 49 Second, based upon its analysis of the
144. 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
145. The New York statute authorized the payment of unemployment compensation to strik-
ers after an eight week waiting period. Pursuant to this statute, the striking employees began to
collect unemployment compensation after the eight week waiting period and were paid benefits
for the remaining five months of the strike. Because New York's unemployment system is
financed primarily by employer contributions based on the benefits paid to former employees, a
substantial part of the costs of these benefits was passed on to the struck employer. New York
Telephone Company sued in federal district court seeking a declaration that the state statute con-
flicted with federal law. The District Court granted the requested relief, holding that the availa-
bility of unemployment compensation was a substantial factor in prolonging the strike and that
the payment of such compensation conflicted "with the policy of free collective bargaining estab-
lished in the federal labor laws and is therefore invalid under the [S]upremacy [Cllause." 434 F.
Supp. 810, 819. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although the New York statute
conflicted with federal labor policy, the legislative histories of the NLRA and the Social Security
Act indicated that such conflict was one which Congress decided to tolerate. 566 F.2d 388, 395.
146. 440 U.S. at 531-32.
147. Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964). In Morton, the Court held that an Ohio court
could not award damages against a union engaged in peaceful secondary picketing even though
the conduct was neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8. Because Congress had focused on
this type of conduct and elected not to proscribe it, the Court inferred a deliberate intent by
Congress to preserve this means of economic warfare for use during the bargaining process. See
also International Union of Elec. Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961), and
Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380 (1969).
148. 440 U.S. at 532.
149. Id. at 533.
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legislative history of the NLRA and the federal Social Security Act, the
plurality found that Congress affirmatively intended to give the states
broad freedom to select the recipients of unemployment compensation
benefits.' 50 The Court's ultimate holding was not controlled by the ap-
plication of traditional preemption principles, i.e., deriving Congress'
intent from the overall policies of the NLRA. Rather, the Court's hold-
ing was predicated on its reading of the legislative histories of the two
competing federal statutes.' 5
The concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, writing on his own
behalf, 5 2 and the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Marshall, 53 expressly rejected the plurality opinion's distinc-
tion between so called "neutral laws" of general applicability and laws
which directly regulate labor management relations. In their view, any
state law, regardless of its form, which regulates or impairs the self-help
capability of labor disputants is preempted absent affirmative evidence
of congressional intent to tolerate state intrusion. 154 Thus, while they
concurred with the plurality's opinion that the state's decision to award
strikers unemployment compensation was not preempted, their agree-
ment turned on their finding that Congress had affirmatively decided
that this form of intrusion into the federal bargaining process was toler-
able. The Court's dissenting members agreed with this analysis. The
dissenters' ultimate disagreement with the outcome of the case rested
solely upon their contrary reading of the legislative histories.155
150. In the plurality's view, "[t]he voluminous history of the Social Security Act made it abun-
dantly clear that Congress intended the several States to have broad freedom in setting up the
types of unemployment compensation they wish." 440 U.S. at 537. Conversely, the plurality
could find "no evidence that the Congress that enacted the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
intended to deny the States the power to provide unemployment benefits for strikers." Id at 540.
151. Id at 537.
152. Justice Brennan refused to "embrace the distinction" made in the plurality's opinion be-
tween laws of general applicability and laws directed particularly at labor management relations.
Id at 547. He indicated that the "case [might be] more of a case of conflicting federal statutes
than a preemption case." Id.
153. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, in a separate concurring opinion agreed
that preemption would apply based solely upon the plurality's analysis of the legislative histories
of the two statutes. Like Justice Brennan, they disassociated themselves from the plurality's pre-
emption analysis and particularly its belief that "congressional intent to deprive the states of their
power to enforce such general laws is more difficult to infer than an intent to pre-empt laws
directed specifically at concerted activity." Id. at 550.
154. Under the analysis proposed by Justice's Blackmun and Marshall, the Machinists case
"compels the conclusion that Congress intended to preempt" any state law which seeks to regulate
or impair a party's self-help capability "unless there is evidence of Congressional intent to tolerate
it." Id at 549.
155. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, dissented. They
viewed the plurality's "law of general applicability" characterization of the New York law as
bearing "no relation to reality." In their view, the fact that the law is not "generally applicable
only to labor management relations" does not mean it is a neutral law. Moreover, "this generality
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The alleged dichotomy between so-called neutral state laws and
those directly regulating labor management relations relied upon by
the Roberts court was, accordingly, explicitly rejected by a majority of
the Court's justices in New York Telephone. 156 Moreover, although
Justices Powell and Burger initially adopted the "neutral" versus "di-
rect regulation" of labor management analysis in their concurring
opinion in Machinists, they soon abandoned this approach in their dis-
senting opinion in New York Telephone. 57 Thus, when the concurring
members' views in New York Telephone are considered together with
the dissenters, who regarded any state law which regulated the permis-
sible weapons of labor or management to be incompatible with federal
labor policy, it seems clear that a majority of the present Supreme
Court would disagree with the Roberts court's analysis.
The Roberts court also refused to acknowledge that the employer's
unilateral imposition of production standards was an economic weapon
intended to be unregulated. It argued that this weapon, unlike the
union's overtime ban in Machinists, was not an integral part of the fed-
eral bargaining process. Rather, in its view, this "right . . .essentially
emanates from the common law, entrepreneurial right of an employer
to run his business."'
158
This novel conclusion appears to be unsupportable. Although Ma-
chinists dealt with economic weapons utilized by labor, both Machin-
ists and Belknap make clear that "self-help is also the prerogative of
the employer."' 59 State regulation of either union or employer weap-
ons is prohibited because Congress has struck the balance of power
between the parties to a collective bargaining relationship. States are
not free to apply local laws to alter that balance. 60 One of the signifi-
cant weapons available to employers is the power to implement
changes incorporated in its final offer following good faith bargain-
ing.161 Unions, aware of this significant power, will be induced to com-
of the law would have little or nothing to do with whether it is pre-empted by the NLRA." 440
U.S. at 558.
156. See discussion, supra notes 152-55, and text accompanying.
157. In their separate concurring opinion in Machinists, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Bur-
ger suggested their "understanding that the Court's opinion does not ... preclude the states from
enforcing, in the context of a labor dispute, 'neutral' state statutes or rules of decision: state laws
that are not directed toward altering the bargaining positions of employers or unions but which
may have an incidental effect on relative bargaining strength." 427 U.S. at 156. Subsequently,
however, they abandoned this approach in their dissenting opinion in New York Telephone. See
discussion supra note 155.
158. Roberts, slip op. at 18.
159. 427 U.S. at 147.
160. Id. at 149-50.
161. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Foods, Inc., 147 NLRB Dec. 59 (1964), and discussion, supra note 140.
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promise their demands prior to reaching impasse in the same manner
as employers, when faced with an imminent strike, will be encouraged
to compromise. Once the parties have reached an impasse, unilateral
change is warranted, not only because it may break the impasse and
thereby induce productive bargaining but also because the failure of
the parties to reach an agreement, after good faith negotiations, should
not permanently restrain the employer from making changes. Any
other rule would preclude the employer from ever taking action with-
out the consent of the union. Thus, the employer's power to implement
changes at the final stages of bargaining, like the union's power to
strike, is "part and parcel of the process of collective bargaining,"
serves to encourage compromise and agreement, and is fully consistent
with the federal policy of encouraging the peaceful resolution of labor
disputes. Because in Roberts application of the employees' pre-existing
Toussaint rights beyond the point of impasse directly thwarts the em-
ployer's ability to exercise its economic power, these rights must yield.
There is yet another reason why state jurisdiction should be re-
quired to yield in Roberts. The plaintiffs in Roberts were not "inno-
cent" third parties. Throughout the negotiations the union bargained
in an effort to benefit the plaintiffs and the other members of the bar-
gaining unit. If the union had successfully reached a contract with the
employer, any pre-existing individual contract rights would have
merged into the collective agreement. 162 The employer's lawful imple-
mentation of its final offer after the parties have negotiated in good
faith and exhausted the bargaining process has the same effect as the
adoption of a collective bargaining agreement. Assuming the em-
ployer's final offer was lawfully put into effect under federal law, any
pre-existing individual contracts should merge into the terms of that
offer. This result finds support in the premise that, once a majority of
employees select a union to represent them, any terms and conditions
of employment lawfully implemented in accordance with the federal
framework structuring a system of bargaining should override any pre-
existing individual rights.
In any event, unlike Belknap, there is a direct conflict between
state and federal rights posed in the Roberts case. While the common
law of contracts is undoubtedly a "neutral law," the use of economic
weapons in labor disputes is an integral component of the collective
bargaining process which Congress implicitly intended to leave unregu-
lated. Any application of state law which disrupts or interferes with a
162. See discussion, supra note 18 and text accompanying.
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labor disputant's right to lawfully exert its economic power improperly
intrudes into the free collective bargaining process established by Con-
gress under the NLRA. Individual contract rights arising under state
law may continue to be enforced during the pendency of negotiations.
However, these rights must yield where there is a supervening collec-
tive agreement, or where, as in Roberts, a bona fide deadlock precludes
agreement, resulting in the lawful implementation of the employer's
last offer.
CONCLUSION
The expansion of individual contract rights under common law
tort and contract principles will undoubtedly continue in response .to
the generally shared belief that non-union employees should have some
of the job protections afforded unionized employees under collective
bargaining agreements. Until recently, however, courts have not been
forced to consider whether and to what extent those rights should be
extended to organized employees.
As this article indicates, efforts to extend those rights to a collective
bargaining context create a potential conflict between individual rights
and national labor policy. Since these individual actions tend to be
brought in state courts which may be unfamiliar with or insensitive to
the implications of their decisions in the broader labor relations con-
text, there is a substantial risk that the state courts will undermine the
large body of federal law and policy developed by the NLRB and the
federal courts over the past forty-five years. While that may serve the
short range interest in protecting the individual employee's rights, it
may weaken the carefully structured federal framework designed to en-
courage and promote the process of collective bargaining. This may, in
the long run, diminish rather than promote the interests of workers
generally.
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